










Grantham, W. and Miller, T. (2017) We hate to quote Stanley 
Fish, but: “There’s no such thing as free speech, and it’s a good 
thing, too.” Or is it? In: Titely, G., Freedman, D., Khiabany, G. 
and Mondon, A., (eds.) After Charlie Hebdo: Terror, Racism and 













http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/id/eprint/41124/     
 
 
Copyright: © 2017 Zed Books 
It is posted here for your personal use. No further distribution is permitted 
 
1 3  |  W E  H A T E  T O  Q U O T E  S T A N L E Y  F I S H ,  B U T : 
“ T H E R E ’ S  N O  S U C H  T H I N G  A S  F R E E  S P E E C H , 
A N D  I T ’ S  A  G O O D  T H I N G ,  T O O . ”  O R  I S  I T ?
Bill Grantham and Toby Miller
In a situation where any allegiance to religion is regarded as odd and 
to be kept under wraps (like the veil which in France mustn’t be worn 
in public) then what comparable freedom of speech can the 6,000 [sic] 
inhabitants of the banlieues1 in Paris have? They conspicuously lack the 
money, education, networking skills and expertise realistically to have 
a voice. Claiming the high moral ground when your opponent can’t 
get a word in edgeways is actually a form of tyranny and not the out-
workings of liberty, equality and fraternity. (Watson 2016: 156) 
While some were tempted, a year ago, to in effect lay blame on Charlie 
Hebdo for having crossed the boundaries of common decency in 
publishing cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, that kind of caveat 
became impossible to utter after attackers opened fire and detonated 
explosive belts on just about anyone: people sitting at cafe terraces, 
spectators at a rock concert, or passers-by near a football stadium. 
(Nougayrède 2016) 
The motive of the attack was mentioned as a revenge against the 
depiction of Prophet Mohammed (p[eace] b[e] u[nto] h[im]) by 
the Magazine, hence [the] Charlie Hebdo incident then provoked 
a worldwide shocks [sic] against Islam and Muslims which the 
Observatory would say, was the most significant turbulence since the 
terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 in the United States. 
(OIC 2015: 27) 
Introduction
The polarities over Charlie Hebdo, as exhibited above by a dedicated 
philosophical religionist, a lapsed Le Monde editor, and the organisation 
of Islamic states, have if anything grown stronger in the period since 
publication of the satirical magazine’s cartoons of Mohammed and 
subsequent assassinations and reactions: cardiovascular incidents in a 
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French hospital increased markedly following the attacks, leading to 
connections being adduced between heightened media coverage and 
intense illness (Della Rosa et al. 2016), there were riots in Niger because 
its President supported Charlie Hebdo, and massive protests against the 
magazine were held across much of the Islamic world (Mueller and 
Matthews 2016; Sreberny 2016).
From François Hollande (2015) marching and militarising to 
Tariq Ali (2015) marching and moralising, duelling certainties have 
dominated the discourse. In that context of profound commitment from 
all sides, this chapter endeavours to do something slightly different. We 
are not principally concerned with binaristic position-taking, so simply 
achieved by those blessed with greater certainty about life than are we. 
Rather, we want to examine the empirical and theoretical questions 
that both inform and arise from the Charlie Hebdo crisis.
We begin with limits to free speech and blasphemy that arise from 
their very foundational institutions and texts. Then we address some of 
the literature about the initial cartoons and assassinations, situating the 
events in debates about speech in the name of liberalism, and violence 
in the name of Islam.
Free speech
The United States is often represented as the bastion of free 
speech, and its eighteenth-century Enlightenment project on behalf 
of white, property-owning men is regularly invoked, both implicitly 
and explicitly, in cases such as Charlie Hebdo. To live in the US, as 
we both did for more than two decades, is to experience a constantly 
replenished fantasy of free speech, where competing perspectives 
forge the truth, unencumbered by censorship. The locus classicus is the 
First Amendment to the US Constitution. The Amendment says the 
following:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 
Its original six guarantees – against the creation of a state religion 
and for freedom of worship, speech, the press, assembly, and the 
right to seek redress from the government – have evolved into more 
general protections of the right to expression, assembly and activism. 
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The apparently limiting language of the Amendment – ‘Congress shall 
make no law’ – has been taken by successive Supreme Courts2 to cover 
the activities of all state and federal governments and agencies. The 
First Amendment implies that these protections guarantee conduits to 
power for ordinary people as well as respites from the religious tyranny, 
sectarianism and warfare of Europe.
In its deliberations on the First Amendment, the Supreme Court 
has dealt with some complicated issues. Many of them stem from 
the quandary ‘What is speech?’ Is burning the national flag a speech 
act? (Yes.) Is legislation nominating English as the national language 
unconstitutional? (Yes.) Can governments erect religious statuary? 
(No.) May a person who peacefully urges citizens to refuse the draft in 
wartime be treated as a criminal? (Yes, because that is the equivalent 
of shouting ‘Fire!’ in a theatre when there is none.)
For critics like our eponym Stanley Fish, limits to speech do not 
only emerge when governments must deal with the damage that open 
discourse may cause in extraordinary, limit cases (1994). Rather, the 
very idea relies on limits: the notion that speech is without adverse – 
or indeed any – material consequences other than the free exchange 
of views, as per an idealised university seminar, assumes that much 
speech is not protected, when it promotes and seeks material action, 
such as harming others. In US jurisprudence, the historical means of 
regulating expression is to say that a particular form does not constitute 
speech. Examples have included defamation, blasphemy, sedition, 
‘fighting words’, pornography and motion pictures. Some of these 
genres have since been re-anointed to fall within the First Amendment’s 
protections. Some have not.
We are suggesting that even in the principal physical and conceptual 
domicile of free speech, there are limits, at certain times and under 
certain laws – and especially when one must distinguish between talking 
and doing. Consider speech-act theory’s notions of constative versus 
performative speech (Austin 1962): ‘I thee wed’ are not just words, 
because they enact a legal relationship, with lasting implications for 
the parties concerned, taxation revenue, state expenditure, healthcare, 
divorce, alimony and inheritance, inter alia. The distance between 
action and speech is compromised.
In the Areopagitica, the Anglo world’s urtext on these matters, 
Milton was happy “to suppress the suppressors themselves” – his 
way of denying Catholics the free-speech rights that he claimed and 
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advocated for his own sect. A less bigoted fellow-traveller, John Stuart 
Mill, famously put it this way:
opinions lose their immunity [from sanction], when the circumstances 
in which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression 
a positive instigation to some mischievous act. An opinion that corn-
dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, 
ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but 
may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob 
assembled before the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about 
among the same mob in the form of a placard. (Mill 1859) 
In other words, free-speech supporters confront practical restrictions 
on speech that are to do with defining it and assessing whether it is in 
the public interest and how it is phrased – as information and opinion 
versus demagoguery. This restriction also extends to who owns speech. 
For instance, the US Copyright Act of 1976 (as subsequently amended) 
incorporates the doctrine of ‘fair use’ to manage restrictions on free 
speech that would otherwise be generated by the concept of intellectual 
property (17 U.S.C. §§ 107). It grants limited rights, for instance, to 
comment on and even through texts produced by others. Providing the 
means to speak can also be part of state policy: from the nineteenth 
century, the US postal service facilitated political conversation by 
subsidising the transportation of newspapers and magazines. It tried to 
do the same in the 1980s via the emergent internet, but was blocked 
by the Republican Party, which favoured granting rights privately to 
telephone companies (McChesney 2013: 204, 103). So the US once 
recognised that the state should in fact enable free speech by subsidising 
it – not just getting out of the way, or regarding it as identical to other 
commodities.
Beyond the US, the preamble to the United Nations’ Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights calls for “a world in which human 
beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear 
and want”, describing this as “the highest aspiration of the common 
people”. Article 19 avows that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions 
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”.
But even those true believers who style themselves ‘Article 19’ now 
offer us ‘Hate Speech’ Explained: A Toolkit to guide governments on 
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restricting the very thing their eponym seeks to guarantee. Article 19 
(the organisation) favours limits to freedom of speech when applied to 
individuals’ dignity, though not in the name of collective notions, such 
as national security, morality, or public order. It accepts the category 
‘hate speech’, while noting that this varies in both definition and legal 
status across jurisdictions and philosophies. For example, YouTube 
and the South African state both link hate speech to violence, but the 
European Court of Human Rights does not. Hence Article 19 argues 
that: “Pluralism is essential, as one person’s deeply held religious belief 
may be offensive to another’s deeply held belief and vice versa. By 
privileging one belief system over another, either in law or in effect, 
restrictions on blasphemy inevitably discriminate against those 
with minority religions or beliefs.” It insists that human beings have 
rights, but religious institutions or abstract commitments such as faith 
do not.
Blasphemy 
Blasphemy is currently the crucial debating point over free speech. 
Cartooning in particular seems to rile anxious sacerdotes, notably 
Charlie Hebdo’s caricatures of all three monotheistic religions; it has 
been unsuccessfully sued for defamation of Catholicism fourteen times 
(R. Ali 2015). Pope Francis condemned both the 2015 killings and 
the caricatures: “One cannot provoke, one cannot insult other people’s 
faith, one cannot make fun of faith. There is a limit … Every religion 
has its dignity” (quoted in McElwee 2015).
The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation,3 which represents fifty-
seven countries over four continents that define themselves as Muslim, 
condemned cartoons of Mohammed that appeared in the Danish 
broadsheet Jyllands-Posten in 2005–6. The Organisation subordinates 
other international protocols to sharia and describes ‘Islamophobia’ as 
“the worst form of terrorism”. Its members generally walk out of global 
gatherings that address queer rights (Howden et al. 2006; Wahab 2007; 
Evans 2012).
The Organisation’s Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam 
(Nineteenth Islamic Conference 1993) avows that in the best world, of 
which Islam is the sole custodian, “knowledge is combined with faith”. 
Article 16 of the Declaration guarantees moral rights to the creators of 
texts, provided they do not run counter to sharia. Article 22 (c) reads: 
“Information is a vital necessity to society. It may not be exploited 
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or misused in such a way as may violate sanctities and the dignity of 
Prophets, undermine moral and ethical Values or disintegrate, corrupt 
or harm society or weaken its faith”; and 22 (d): “It is not permitted to 
excite nationalistic or doctrinal hatred or to do anything that may be an 
incitement to any form or [sic] racial discrimination.”
This logic argues that the Charlie Hebdo cartoons may be deemed 
both blasphemous, because they ridicule a historic leader of a religion, 
and defamatory, as they also ridicule adherents of that religion. In 
addition, the way that supporters of the magazine expressed their 
sentiments is perceived by some as solidarity against Islam as much as 
for free speech (Cox 2016).
Emanuel Todd (2015) argues that blasphemy should not be 
outlawed, but needs self-regulation because of the offence and discord 
it provokes among the disenfranchised. Advocates for this position also 
note the ambivalence of existing international accords on the right to 
mock religions:
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights … and the 
European Convention on Human Rights … quite clearly do allow 
for the possibility of speech being restricted in the name of public 
morality, and if and when a religion is inextricably linked with a 
nation’s public morality, then it is difficult to see why this justification 
for restricting speech could not apply, at least in theory, to irreligious 
speech. (Cox 2016: 203) 
Given that Muslims represent a quarter of the world’s population 
and Islam is the official religion of a quarter of all countries, rejecting 
their state codes of blasphemy is akin to saying that international 
law need not be endorsed by vast numbers in order to be sovereign. 
Contra this position, the 2013 Rabat Plan of Action, adopted by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and many 
other international authorities, insists that blasphemy should not 
subvert free speech.4 As a practical matter, it is clear that countries 
which favour prohibiting negative representations of religion are most 
likely to prohibit religious freedom (Henne 2013). Islamic states that 
prohibit blasphemy are generally authoritarian and experience violent 
resistance by their subjects. Nilay Saiya’s research demonstrates that:
blasphemy laws encourage terrorism by creating a culture of 
vigilantism in which terrorists, claiming to be the defenders of Islam, 
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attack those they believe are guilty of heresy. This study empirically 
tests this proposition, along with alternative hypotheses, using a 
time-series, cross[-]national negative binomial analysis of 51 Muslim-
majority states from 1991-2013. It finds that states that enforce 
blasphemy laws are indeed statistically more likely to experience 
Islamist terrorist attacks than countries where such laws do not exist. 
(Saiya 2016) 
The Qur’an does not prescribe punishments for blasphemy, or 
prohibit representation of its true believers’ favourite prophet (Saiya 
2016). There are rather non-specific, albeit vaguely threatening, fates 
awaiting blasphemers, but no sign of this occurring in the material world. 
And it is worth noting that #jesuiskouachi was used 49,000 times on the 
day of the attacks on Charlie (Badouard 2016). The hashtag’s adherents 
relished using their right to free speech to support murder. Meanwhile, 
the mimetic nature of many recent terrorist attacks, combined with 
the tendency for them to be committed by social outcasts and those 
imprisoned for petty crime or sectioned for mental health reasons, 
might make us ponder whether intense ideological force was their sole 
impetus (Crone 2016).
Besides, not all Muslims are as vulnerable and sanctimonious as their 
bien-pensants. Islamic humourists all over the world routinely engage in 
religious satire, mocking themselves and others. Their number includes 
cartoonists subject to fatwas and state harassment, such as Ali Ferzat, Ali 
Dilem, Zunar and Musa Kart, and authors who specialise in Bakhtinian 
profanation (Hirzalla and van Zoonen 2016; Salovaara 2015; El Hissy 
2013). As blasphemy laws bite, Muslim cartoonists continue to chafe 
against their governments’ pious assaults (Crispin 2015). On the free-
speech side of the debate, satirical French Muslim rappers are routinely 
denied the right to expression by the state (Kleppinger 2016). Both 
groups of Islamic satirists relish the genre’s capacity to cause offence. 
That is its very point.
So what should we do about the issues raised by Charlie Hebdo? To 
answer that query, we must go back, and back some more. 
Diversity and culture 
We all know that the history of Europe is chaotic, fraught, global, 
and forged in relation to bellicose encounters north, south, east and 
west. This occurred via both Islamic imperialism and the continent’s 
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more successful Christian reconquest. The latter regarded religious 
imperialism abroad as a ‘complement’ to ‘positivist nation-building 
at home’, with bloodletting legitimised by capitalism and nationalism 
(Asad 2005: 2). But the “history of individual peoples, and indeed 
of whole continents such as ‘Europe’, is now being written in terms 
of a cultural formation defined by something outside, ‘the other’” 
(Halliday 2001: 113). Cultural differences see the colonising nations 
altered by their migrant populations’ languages, religions, cuisines, 
clothing and senses of self, especially when they come from formerly 
enslaved/colonised lands; hence the famous slogan from the 1970s 
popularised by migrant activists in the UK: ‘We are here because you 
were there.’
Debates about religion in Europe were historically about the 
commensurability of Protestantism and Catholicism within and 
between states. Today, the issue is Islam, both as a racial referent and 
a governmental alternative to secularism. Habermas explains that de-
territorialised terrorism, by non-state as well as state actors, has been 
unleashed by a potent mixture of faith, fraud, ethnicity and economics 
in response to Western violence, taunts and fiefdoms (2006). The 
reality today is that “[i]ncreasing numbers of citizens … do not belong. 
This in turn undermines the basis of the nation-state as the central site 
of democracy” (Castles and Davidson 2000: viii). Working in London 
or Paris means confronting the endgame of these interactions on a 
routine basis and encountering vicious reactions from nativists who 
deny their own bloody past.
That said, one can exaggerate the impact of violent Islamic 
encounters on European public opinion. According to a 2016 Pew 
Research Centre attitudinal survey, most people in France, Britain 
and Germany are positive about Muslims. Spanish views are more 
ambiguous, while negativity predominates in Poland and Italy. The 
gap between left and right is relevant: 36 per cent of Germans on the 
right dislike Islam, but just 15 per cent on the left do so. The situation 
is similar in Italy and France (Hackett 2016). Across France, Belgium, 
Germany, Britain and the Netherlands, concerns about Muslim 
communities have led to calls to restrict migration. Muslims themselves 
are largely content with a separation of church and state, which finds 
them delinking faith from fealty (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2015). It is 
also worth noting that much of this negative public opinion is based 
on profound ignorance: “European publics wildly overestimate the 
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proportion of their populations that is Muslim … on average French 
respondents thought 31% of their compatriots were Muslim, against 
an actual figure closer to 8%” (The Economist 2015).
But regardless of the data, the difficulty of bridging the distance 
between Europe’s dominant groups and its Muslim minorities is 
very strong, due to a myriad of moral panics, folk devils, incendiary 
religionists, gullible youth, opportunistic politicians and militarised 
states. In Jesús Prieto de Pedro’s words:
The European liberal constitutions of the nineteenth century were 
political constitutions … The constitutions of the first third of the 
twentieth century … were devoted to economic and social issues … 
another stage is evidenced in the decade of the 1970s in the eruption 
of cultural concerns: this generates lexical forms and doctrinal 
categories such as ‘cultural rights’ … the free existence of culture, 
cultural pluralism, and the access of citizens to culture are guaranteed 
in intensified forms. (de Pedro 1999: 63) 
This raises a series of complex questions, such as whether minority 
cultures should be protected from external rule when retention of 
cultural norms may prevent dynamic change and shackle individual 
autonomy. For example, should members of a culture be protected 
by the state from internal oppression when their human rights are 
compromised in the name of religion, or when the well-being of 
outsiders is threatened? What should be done about host nations’ 
economic and cultural insecurities, which may be projected onto new 
arrivals? Should liberalism’s lofty but contingent sense of tolerance be 
celebrated or castigated in contrast with religion’s pious intolerance? 
And what is the responsibility of the bourgeois media to cover Islam in 
ways endorsed by the religion (Johnson 2000: 406, 408; Runnymede 
Trust 2000: 240; Sian 2015)? Western media representations of Islam 
continue to stereotype it, emphasising violence and negative storylines 
(Ahmed and Matthes 2016).
And the response of states confronted by this cultural difference? 
Driven by a security and financial agenda, European Union cultural 
policy has focused over the last forty years on the Cold War, terrorism, 
economic efficiency, Hollywood, and migrant integration. The media 
are expected at once to inform and represent new arrivals, right the 
wrongs of stereotypes, encourage identification with Europe, and 
function as efficient and effective industries. For their part, migrants 
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are dual targets: of the state, to ensure fealty; and of commerce, to 
ensure consumption (Mattelart and d’Haenens 2014).
There are many complex limit cases – for example, when a British 
woman rejected her Muslim parents’ plans for an arranged marriage, 
they sought intervention by the state in the name of cultural maintenance, 
citing the exemption of Sikhs from safety helmet legislation to ensure 
protection of their headgear culture as a precedent. Here is a case where 
measures designed to protect minorities from outside harassment may in 
fact insulate them from internal dissent, with the state ultimately policing 
religious observance and familial power dynamics. In this instance, the 
courts found in favour of the woman, citing the priority of protecting 
individual rights and doubting the representativeness of self-appointed 
community spokespeople (Benhabib 2002: 19; Kymlicka 1995: 2, 35–
6). When such grand narratives of collectivity and individualism collide, 
liberal states must double-declutch between support for “a community 
of individuals and a community of communities” (Runnymede Trust 
2000: 176–7, 240).
The literature on Charlie 
The ‘Global North’ is inclined to explain natural and social 
phenomena without reference to deities, but equally without reference 
to the social importance of showing respect for those deities as a means of 
living together. How does that rate next to the threat and actuality 
of individual or mass murder (Cliteur 2016)?
Religious philosophy advises that opposing religion and reason 
amounts to ‘intellectual apartheid’, arguing that “the anti-religious 
stance displayed in the cartoons reflects freedom of speech for one set 
of worldviews but not for others” (Watson 2016). This is a category 
mistake about cartoons and what they are. Should a sermon, a political 
column, or a party manifesto include all sides to debates? They are 
not textbook chapters, mathematical proofs, kinship maps or scientific 
documentaries, which claim to give unvarnished accounts of fact. 
There is no reason why a cartoon should enunciate all sides to an issue, 
or be impartial.
As noted earlier, Charlie Hebdo has treated religious icons, figures 
and beliefs of various kinds with equal contempt across its history. But 
we are instructed that when it comes to Mohammed, “Charlie Hebdo 
caricatures are an example of ill judged, uncontrolled and limitless 
freedom of speech and a risky action that may have future consequences 
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that might cause moral harm” (Švaňa 2016: 67). Again, this is a category 
mistake. It is ludicrous to place this burden on cartooning as opposed 
to other genres, such as reportage, religious incantation, or letters to the 
editor. Balance of this kind should not be expected of particular satirical 
works of art. Such desires are a philosophical religious indulgence.
More credibly, the Iranian government criticised both the cartoonists 
and the gunmen (Barry 2016). The eminent Hegelian communitar-
ian and New Left Review founder Charles Taylor distanced himself 
from the murder, but argued that such attacks should surprise no one 
given the magazine’s additions to the social critique and marginalisation 
already experienced by those it mocked. While opposing limits to free 
speech, Taylor pointed to the folly of exercising it in such ways (Swan 
2015). And Delfeil de Ton (the pen name of Charlie co-founder Henri 
Roussel) denounced his assassinated colleagues for recklessly exposing 
themselves and others to danger (M.C. 2015).
For Will Self (2015), satire presupposes a shared ethics and sense 
of justice as its precondition, and the prospect of unsettling power and 
comforting weakness. The genre relies on social and cultural specificity, 
not the breadth of interpretation or right and wrong that comes with 
daily duels between religious and secular governance. So he discerns 
an error by Charlie Hebdo: misreading the nation within which it was 
nested.
Responses to the attack on Twitter saw #JeSuisCharlie become “a 
metaphor for organising news flows, opinions, affects and participatory 
events in the digital media ecosystem”. Within an hour of the murders, 
a dedicated wiki page had emerged (updated and translated into seventy 
languages), and within a day, over fifty French and international 
cities featured tributes. A phone application soon emerged to connect 
supporters wherever they were (Salovaara 2015). “[N]on-Arabs living 
in Arab countries … [used] #JeSuisAhmed (‘I am Ahmed’) five times 
more often when … embedded in a mixed Arab/non-Arab … network. 
Among Arabs living in the West, we find a great variety of responses, 
not altogether associated with the size of their expatriate community” 
(An et al. 2016). The political postures underpinning various hashtags 
have been clustered to disclose that #CharlieHebdo is linked to 
sympathy for victims, #JeSuisCharlie with absolutist support for free 
speech, #JeNeSuisPasCharlie with a cross-sectarian rejection of free 
speech both by Muslims (as offensive) and for Muslims (as something 
they do not warrant), and #JeSuisAhmed with recognition that a 
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Muslim policeman was among those whose life was taken, and the need 
for limitations on free speech. Their use maps closely onto regions of 
linguistic and religious sectarianism, apart from #JeNeSuisPasCharlie, 
which appealed to right-wing Islamists and Christians alike, for different 
reasons (ibid.).
Most Parisian marchers supporting the magazine were from the 
middle and elite classes (Todd 2015). As hundreds of noted writers put 
it, “‘equal opportunity offence’ is the aspiration of Charlie Hebdo. 
But how is such an aspiration to be fulfilled unless the disparate 
‘targets’ of offence occupy an equal position and have an equivalent 
meaning within the dominant culture?” (quoted in Greenwald 2015). 
This is the argument in favour of free speech being rooted in respect 
for differences (Hietalahti et al. 2016).
The 2015 attack and others have unleashed a state response that is 
unparalleled in the last sixty years, and not just as per the libertarian 
left’s cliché complaints about surveillance. It is much more important 
and strategic than that logic will admit:
For the first time since the end of the Second World War, the 
assumption that France is experiencing a new form of territorial war 
is explicit in the public debate. It has reinforced the strong conviction 
among the French politicians and diplomats that security requires 
close cooperation with the USA and a renouncement of the Gaullist 
paradigm of exceptionalism. (Lequesne 2016) 
The billionaire feminist critic Élisabeth Badinter called for a boycott 
of stores selling Islamic fashion; Laurence Rossignol, a socialist minis-
ter, likened Muslim women in headscarves to African Americans sup-
porting slavery; and Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, the Education Minister, 
proposed a programme of re-education for pupils who failed to support 
the magazine.5 French international broadcasting attributed the attacks 
to foreigners (Hollis-Touré 2016; Kiwan 2016; Połońska-Kimunguyi 
and Gillespie 2016). Meanwhile, dissident intellectuals refuse the gov-
ernment’s pleas for unity and the call for Islam to denounce the attacks, 
because this fails to recognise the heterogeneous backgrounds and insti-
tutions of Muslims (Kiwan 2016).
Conclusion
Because partially incommensurate world views and ethnicities are 
now engaged in uncomfortable frottage, we need a new convivencia 
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(Veninga 2016). Advocating, protecting and practising free speech is 
asserted to be socially beneficial, although the claim that a particular text 
lacks social benefit does not invalidate it. But when the preponderance 
of discourse is opposed to a religion followed by such vast numbers, 
something needs to give on all sides. This should be a matter of case-
by-case judgement by participants, be they pious or professional. Both 
doctrinal and public-policy activity must insist on the centrality of 
living together, with all the contradictions and paradoxes that implies 
about minority welfare, social peace, and freedom of speech.
Notes
1 The term banlieues is not a formal 
administrative one. No census numbers 
are kept that would give a clear idea 
of how many people live in them, but 
this number appears extremely low. 
The term is used popularly to describe 
impoverished areas characterised 
by housing projects and immigrant 
populations. France is said to be home 
to around 6 million Muslims, three-
quarters of North African descent 
(Połońska-Kimunguyi and Gillespie 
2016: 570).
2 Interestingly, no free-speech case 
reached the Court for the first 128 years 






5 Of the 64,000 French schools, 
pupils at 200 declined to observe a 
minute’s silence of respect for the deaths 
at Charlie Hebdo (i.e. to agree to have 
their speech stilled) (Stille 2015).
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